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Abstract. South Korea’s experience wielding soft power is usually associated with 
the Korean Wave, which swept the Asian region off its feet predominantly during the 
first decade of this century. In this article I will however argue that the phenomenon 
of the Korean Wave has never been intended as a calculated attempt on the part of 
the South Korean government to enhance the overall South Korean image worldwide 
and thus increase South Korean international might and prestige. To prove the validity 
of this hypothesis, I will provide a concise historical overview of the inception, 
development and spread of South Korean popular culture, while at the same time 
tracing its underlying soft power implications. I will likewise attempt to discuss the 
popular reception of the Korean Wave in three East Asian countries, i.e. Mainland 
China, Taiwan and Japan, and one European country, i.e. Lithuania. The scope of the 
endeavour has been largely restricted to the cinematic aspect of the Korean Wave, 
for I consider the creation of motion pictures and drama serials to be by far the most 
precious, influential and revealing form of art.
Soft power, hard power or smart power: The predicament  
of one-dimensional players in a three-dimensional game
The political concept ‘soft power’ first appeared in Joseph S. Nye’s book (1990) and 
has since drawn to itself a relatively significant amount of academic attention. Thus 
within the contemporary theory of international relations, one can roughly distinguish 
between not only military and economic but also soft power.
On the human plane, soft power, popularly defined by Nye as ‘an ability to 
get what you want through attraction rather than coercion’, rests on the skills of 
emotional intelligence, vision, and communication; on the state plane, it stems from 
the attractiveness of culture, the sincerity of values, and the legitimacy of policies 
(Nye 2004a).
While according to Nye, of the three modes of political power, soft power 
has the greatest potential to deal with critical global issues and foster multilateral 
cooperation among states, its application is usually unduly severely restricted due to 
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various preconceived assumptions on the part of both political scientists and political 
decision makers (ibid.). The scholar dismally observes that, largely disregarding the 
changing nature of power, political leaders internationally refuse to incorporate soft 
dimensions into their power-wielding strategies (Nye 2004b, 1).
When introducing the concept ‘soft power’, Nye starts by providing the prevalent 
definition of power, then goes on to correlate it with political context, subsequently 
discussing the changing nature of power in today’s age of information revolution and 
finally positing why it is imperative to pay a higher degree of attention to the third 
dimension of political power, i.e. soft power, and in general see the contemporary 
political system as three-dimensional rather than one-dimensional (ibid.).
If, according to Nye, power per se can be defined as the possession of the 
capabilities to affect the behaviour of others in order to get a desired outcome, three 
ways of exercising political power can be discerned: (a) coercion with threats; (b) 
inducement with payments; (c) attraction and co-option (ibid., 2).
Besides the three modes of exercising political power highlighted above, both 
political decision makers and political scientists tend to directly correlate the 
presence of power with the possession of material resources. Consequently, according 
to Nye, a country is considered powerful if it has a relatively large population and 
territory, extensive natural resources, economic strength, military power, and social 
stability (ibid., 3). This way of defining power endows it with the characteristics of 
concreteness, measurability and predictability, all of which are somewhat misleading 
because having the assets mentioned above does not necessarily guarantee the 
desired outcome on the part of the possessor of the assets. To illustrate the weakness 
of viewing power as a direct manifestation of material resources, Nye touches upon 
the dire calamity of September 11, pointing out that it did happen despite the fact 
that back then in 2001 the United States of America was considered the world’s only 
superpower (ibid.).
Speaking of the changing nature of power, Nye distinguishes between the pre-
information age and the information age, arguing that before the information age 
power was much easier to assess and it was done so in international politics in terms of 
warfare (ibid.). Importantly, over the centuries alongside the industrial, technological 
and information revolution, means of warfare have evolved dramatically. Hence, it 
is downright misleading to assume that the contemporary distribution of political 
power can be accounted for by taking into consideration solely military or economic 
assets (ibid.).
The agenda of world politics, astutely observes Nye, has become like a three 
dimensional chess game, in which one can win only by playing vertically as well as 
horizontally (ibid., 4). In other words, to follow Nye’s way of putting it and to use the 
  123T H E  S O F T  P O W E R  I M P L I C AT I O N S  O F  T H E  N E W  S O U T H  K O R E A N  C I N E M A
case of the United States of America as an example, on the top board of classic interstate 
military issues, the United States of America can still be viewed as the only super 
power with global military reach. On the middle board of interstate economic issues, 
the distribution of power is by all means multipolar, however. Lastly, on the bottom 
board of transnational issues like terrorism, international crime, climate change, 
and the spread of infectious diseases, power is widely distributed and chaotically 
organised among state and non-state actors (ibid.). Significantly, it is the latter set of 
issues or else the bottom board that the contemporary theory of international relations 
should pay a considerable amount of attention to, but unfortunately many political 
leaders still obstinately cling to classic military solutions.  Nye refers to the latter set 
of injudicious political leaders as one-dimensional players in a three-dimensional 
game. In the long run, maintains Nye, their lack of perception is bound to produce 
a loss since obtaining favourable outcomes on the bottom transnational board often 
requires the use of soft power (ibid., 5).
Nye suggests that a successful strategy for wielding the soft power of a country 
results in (a) its values being admired, (b) its example being emulated, (c) and its 
level of prosperity and openness being aspired to (ibid.).
All in all, according to Nye, soft power is primarily an attractive power. Nye refutes 
the Machiavellian perception of power, which stresses fear rather than admiration as 
the inherent component of power, and argues that in today’s world the wisest way to 
perpetrate politics requires both components. Consequently, a well-balanced application 
of both soft power and hard power results in what Nye refers to as ‘smart power’.
The soft power implications  
of the contemporary South Korean film industry
South Korean cinematic production, first and foremost including television dramas 
and film, has today become a widely consumed cultural commodity not only in 
Asia but also in Europe, the Americas, and other parts of the world. South Korean 
television dramas such as Winter Sonata (2002), Jewel in the Palace (2003), Full 
House (2004), You’re Beautiful (2009), etc. and South Korean movies such as Shiri 
(1999), Joint Security Area (2000), My Sassy Girl (2001), Oldboy (2003), etc. have 
enchanted daily increasing audiences not only domestically but also internationally. To 
borrow an observation made by Shim Doobo, the overwhelming popularity of South 
Korean contemporary culture in Asia, for once, is evidenced by the fact that it has 
even become material for the Malaysian song ‘I am not... Song Seung-Heon’, where 
two male singers express the feelings of a man whose girlfriend is infatuated with 
the South Korean actor Song Seungheon (Shim, Doobo 2008, 16). This part of the 
article will attempt to account for the unprecedented international appeal of South 
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Korean cinematic culture by closely tracing the soft power implications underlying 
the Korean Wave. Besides governmental policies, the business initiatives of domestic 
conglomerates will also be taken into consideration, because the latter factor has been 
considerably significant in redefining the trajectory of South Korean cinematic culture.
The inner transformation  
of the South Korean film industry
Media liberalisation
The period of the late 1980s and early 1990s was an important juncture for the South 
Korean cinema industry because of the market opening to foreign distributors. In 
1986 the South Korean government finally amended the Motion Picture Law (MPL) 
to respond to demands from the Motion Picture Export Association of America 
(MPEAA) and alleviated the regulations on foreign investment in the South Korean 
film industry. What is more, the import quota and the tax imposed on foreign films 
were also abolished that same year (Choi 2010, 7). After the governmental measure 
had been implemented and direct distribution by major Hollywood studios had been 
granted, the annual number of local film productions began to gradually decrease 
and that of foreign film imports started to increase. Consequently, in 1993 poorly 
performing local movies accounted for a record low of 15.9% of the domestic market 
share. Observers predicted the inevitable demise of South Korean cinema (Shim, 
Doobo 2008, 16).
When in 1994 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was transformed 
into the World Trade Organization (WTO), all former member states of GATT, including 
South Korea, were soon obliged to open their markets in media communications and 
culture. Significantly, this sector had been protected from foreign competition since the 
early days of GATT (Shim, Doobo 2008, 16; Shim, Sungeun 2008, 207). Subsequently, 
the South Korean press began to write that while culture was emerging as a new sector 
in global economic competition, South Korea was in danger of its indigenous culture 
being debased by foreign media. On the other hand, the cultural industry’s contribution 
to national economies in the coming 21st century was also stressed (Shim, Doobo 2008, 
17). In other words, South Korea perceived the inevitable media liberalisation as both a 
crisis and an opportunity (Shim, Sungeun 2008, 209).
Substantial contribution of chaebols 
Also in 1994, the Presidential Advisory Board on Science and Technology proposed 
to President Kim Youngsam that South Korea should develop cinema and other 
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media content production as a national strategic industry. Interestingly, what the 
proposal highlighted was that the total revenue of the Hollywood movie Jurassic Park 
(1993) amounted to the foreign sales of 1.5 million Hyundai cars (Shim, Doobo 2008, 
17; Shim, Sungeun 2008, 210). Significantly, according to Shim Doobo, the South 
Koreans, who had strongly believed that it was the heavy and chemical industries—
including automobile, construction and electronic industries—that would lead their 
country to a more prosperous future, found this information ground-breaking (Shim, 
Doobo 2008, 17). Thus in 1995 the National Assembly replaced the existing Motion 
Picture Law with a new one, which stated that the government would provide tax 
incentives for film production in order to attract corporate capital into the South 
Korean cinema industry (ibid.).
Shim Doobo further asserts that major domestic conglomerates, called chaebols, 
(including Samsung, Daewoo and Hyundai) had already been planning for cultural 
content production, taking cues from the Japanese company Sony Electronics’ 
acquisition of Columbia Pictures and CBS Records in 1989 and 1988, respectively 
(ibid.; Inoue 2003, 39). Hence, at no time did the chaebols make use of the 
governmental assistance while advancing into the cultural industry (Shim, Doobo 
2008, 17). However, when after several years of operation these ventures proved 
to be loss-making, the chaebols started to look for opportunities to exit from the 
cultural industry, and the financial crisis of late 1997 provided them with excuses to 
do so (ibid., 19).
Importantly, despite its short-lived and seemingly unsuccessful character, the 
chaelbol age of South Korean cinema industry, points out Shim Doobo, actually 
laid the foundation for a renaissance in the South Korean cinema industry due to 
the following reasons. First, by holding independent film festivals and film scenario 
contests with considerable cash prizes, chaebol-run film companies recruited 
fresh talent. Second, chaebols supported young directors who had graduated from 
prestigious film studios all over the world and who would otherwise have had to 
wait for many years for their debut film. Third, many highly competent chaebol-staff 
members from diverse fields of business were put into the cinema business (Shim, 
Doobo 2008, 19). All in all, to borrow Anthony C. Y. Leong’s words, the chaebols’ 
contribution transformed South Korea’s film industry into a more professional and 
business-oriented infrastructure that integrated it all: production, distribution and 
exhibition (Leong 2006, 9). Furthermore, even after the chaebols had folded their 
film businesses, a great number of former chaebol employees remained in the cinema 
industry, and it is common knowledge that many successful South Korean movies 
in recent years have been planned and marketed by these very people (Shim, Doobo 
2008, 19).
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Sponsorship of venture capitalists
More or less simultaneous with the withdrawal of the chaebols from the South Korean 
film industry was the appearance of fast-profit-oriented venture capitalists (Shin, Stringer 
2005, 43). Shim Doobo ironically observes that right after the Samsung Entertainment 
group had officially announced its breakup, the action thriller Shiri (1999), which 
Samsung had planned and funded as its final project, proved to be a big hit, attracting 
5.8 million cinema goers nationwide and thus setting a new box-office record in South 
Korea. That Shiri was likewise partly funded by a venture capitalist, further argues the 
scholar, gave many prospective investors the cue to finance film productions. Shim 
Doobo adds that in 1999 the South Korean government revised the Motion Picture 
Promotion Law, thus facilitating venture capitalists’ funding of film productions. Due 
to these reasons, venture capitalists funded (partly or exclusively) twenty-three out of 
fifty-eight South Korean movies produced in 2000 (Shim, Doobo 2008, 20).
Once it was possible for individuals to finance film productions, the South Korean 
cinema industry managed to churn out more blockbusters. According to data gathered 
by the Korean Film Council and highlighted by Shim, in 2001 the box-office record 
of Shiri (1999) was broken by that of Joint Security Area (2000). Several months 
later Friends (2001) sold the unprecedented amount of 8.2 million admission tickets. 
In 2004 Silmido (2003) set a box-office record by selling 11.08 million tickets, and 
in 2006 King and the Clown (2005) attracted more than 12 million viewers (ibid.). 
Upheld by these and other well-performing local movies, the South Korean cinema’s 
domestic market share continuously increased from 15.9% in 1993 to 35.5% in 2000 
to over 50% in 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005 (ibid.).
Due to its considerable transformation and subsequent domestic success, the 
South Korean film industry has managed to attract large overseas audiences.
The international spread  
of South Korean cinematic culture
Exports of South Korean film and drama
When the blockbuster Shiri was sold to several Asian countries, it received both 
critical and commercial acclaim. Specifically, it earned US$14 million from 1.2 
million Japanese cinemagoers alone. Since the international success of Shiri (1999), 
many South Korean movies have been released for commercial run in foreign theatres 
and won prizes at such prestigious film festivals as Cannes, Berlin and Venice (ibid., 
21). In 2004 a total of 193 South Korean films were exported to 62 countries, earning 
approximately US$58 million, while in 1995 only a relatively moderate total of 15 
South Korean movies reached foreign audiences, earning approximately US$200,000. 
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As of 2004, Japan was the biggest importer of South Korean films, accounting for 
69.3% of all South Korean film exports. With 33 South Korean films released in 
Japan in 2004, South Korean movies took a 10% share of the Japanese film market 
(ibid., 21–2). According to Kim Meehyun, head of the Film Policy Division at the 
Korean Film Council, the majority of Japanese viewers of South Korean films in 
2004 were middle-aged women whose interest was piqued by their fandom of the 
television drama Winter Sonata (2002) (ibid., 22). Importantly, Minwha Han et al. 
contests the insight above, arguing that while Winter Sonata was especially popular 
among middle-aged Japanese women, the Korean Wave cut a boarder swath across 
Japanese socio-demographic groups, including men and women of all ages and 
notably teenagers (Han, et al. 2007, 156).
Notwithstanding the remarkable popularity of South Korean films abroad, the 
most successful export commodity from the South Korean audio-visual industry has 
been television dramas (Shim, Sungeun 2008, 205).
It was around the turn of the 1990s when the South Korean television industry 
began to export television dramas. Around 1992 Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation 
(MBC) sold Eyes of the Dawn to Turkiye Radyo Televizyon (TRT), Turkey’s national 
broadcaster, marking the first South Korean television drama to be exported to a 
European country, and What Is Love All About to Hong Kong’s Asia Television Ltd. 
(ATV) (Shim, Doobo 2008, 24–5). Significantly, it is generally agreed that the Korean 
Wave started in Mainland China with the broadcast of the latter television drama. In 
1997 it was aired by China Central Television (CCTV) and was rebroadcast by the 
same broadcaster in 1998 by popular demand (ibid., 25).
In the late 1990s, when the popularity of Japanese television dramas began to 
wane in Taiwan, Taiwanese importers began to purchase cheaper South Korean 
television dramas. In so doing, they helped South Korean television dramas penetrate 
into markets in Hong Kong and Mainland China (ibid.).
In addition, in the late 1990s the economic downturn in Asia made the cheaper 
South Korean cinematic goods a popular alternative in the aforementioned media 
markets. Interestingly, as of 2000, South Korean television dramas were a quarter of 
the price of Japanese ones and a tenth of the price of Hong Kong television dramas 
(ibid., 28). What is more, East Asian governments had for a long time been on the 
defensive against cultural influences from foreign countries, but in the 1990s, following 
the global trend, they began to open their television markets. Even the previously 
tightly controlled television markets in Mainland China and Vietnam, points out Shim, 
loosened their television programming import policies. The scholar adds that at the 
same time economic development among many Asian countries afforded their citizens 
leisure and facilities to consume more cultural artefacts (ibid., 25–6).
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After their initial popular reception within the pan-Chinese pop sphere (comprising 
Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Chinese communities in Southeast Asia) 
and Vietnam, South Korean television dramas gradually expanded their reach.
Produced by the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) in 2002, Winter Sonata was 
first broadcast on the Japanese satellite channel NHK BS2 in April 2003 and was re-
aired on the same channel in December of the same year. Goaded by surging audience 
demand, NHK BS2 aired it for a third time on the NHK general channel from April to 
August 2004. In late December 2004, the uncut version of the South Korean television 
drama in the Korean language with Japanese subtitles made a fourth run, which was a 
record for a foreign programme on the Japanese public broadcasting network (ibid., 
26; Han et al. 2007, 157).
As the popularity of South Korean television dramas was gradually weakening in 
the pan-Chinese pop sphere, Jewel in the Palace rekindled the craze for South Korean 
popular culture (Shim, Doobo 2008, 26). For instance, in May 2005 the drama’s final 
episode became the most watched television broadcast in Hong Kong’s history, with 
more than 40% of Hong Kong viewers glued to the TV set (Kim, Ryoo 2007, 140).
The reasons as to why South Korean television dramas are popular among foreign 
audiences vary depending on the scholar.
Shim Doobo notes that, for audiences in developing countries such as Mainland 
China and Vietnam, South Korean television dramas are more acceptable than 
Japanese or American ones because the former retain traditional values while having 
achieved the technical sophistication comparable to that of the latter. South Korea is 
therefore viewed by the Chinese and Vietnamese as a prominent model to follow or 
catch up to, both culturally and economically (Shim, Doobo 2008, 27).
In her article, Sung Sangyeon, a lecturer of philological and cultural studies in 
the Department of Musicology at the University of Vienna, discerns four reasons for 
the popularity of the Korean Wave in Asia: (a) South Korean popular culture most 
delicately and eloquently expresses Asian values and sentiments, (b) the economic 
decline in Asia in the late 1990s forced television producers to dispense with the 
conventional expensive cultural goods and to seek out cheaper South Korean cultural 
commodities, (c) South Korean popular culture expresses a considerable amount 
of healthy self-confidence and nationalism, (d) South Korean popular culture has 
managed to borrow the best of its Western counterparts while at the same time 
retaining distinct Korean characteristics (Sung 2008, 14).
Significantly, Kim Eunmee and Ryoo Jiwon argue that the commonly available 
explanations for the success of hallyu in the Asian region, including (a) cultural 
proximity, (b) common historical and cultural legacy, (c) common 20th century 
experience of rapid industrialisation in the region, etc., cannot adequately explain 
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why hallyu has taken Asia by storm while popular cultures from other Asian nations 
have not (Kim, Ryoo 2007, 117).
Be that as it may, the dramatic aspect of the Korean Wave is now expanding to 
Europe, Africa, the Americas, and other parts of the world. For instance, the total 
amount of exports of South Korean television programmes dramatically increased 
from US$5.5 million in 1995 to US$71.4 million in 2004 (Shim, Doobo 2008, 27).
The popular reception of the cinematic aspect of the Korean Wave  
in the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of China, and Japan
Cai Jian, an associate professor in the Centre for Korean Studies at the Institute of 
International Studies of Fudan University of China, is confident that even though 
the Korean Wave has touched many countries it has found the greatest success in 
the People’s Republic of China, especially when the South Korean TV drama Jewel 
in the Palace (2003) was aired in the People’s Republic of China in 2005 (Cai 2008, 
100–1). The professor even accounts for the huge popularity of the Korean Wave in 
the People’s Republic of China by recounting the response of top Chinese leaders to 
this very South Korean drama.
When Hu Jintao, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, met with 
the leader of Korea’s Uri Party, points out Cai, he expressed his regret that he could 
not watch Jewel in the Palace every day because of his tight work schedule. Further 
speaking of the popularity of the South Korean drama among high ranking Chinese 
officials, China’s Vice President Zeng Qinghong also admitted to having watched 
several episodes of this drama and Wu Bangguo mentioned that both he and his wife 
watched the show whenever they had time to do so, a remark leading to extensive 
Chinese media coverage of the unprecedented surge of South Korean popular culture 
in the People’s Republic of China (ibid., 101–2).
The professor posits the Chinese affection for all things Korean on the premise 
of mutual cultural affinities. He asserts that over thousands of years China and Korea 
have had a close historical relationship that has led to a common cultural background. 
In Cai’s view, both China and Korea belong to the East Asian Confucian circle of 
culture in the sense that the civilisation of Han has deeply influenced not only the 
Korean language and values, but also Korea’s etiquette, customs and social structure. 
According to Cai, it is for these reasons that the Chinese find it easy to accept and 
understand the cultural commodities produced by the Korean Wave (ibid., 103).
Importantly, Cai finds the dissemination and popularity of the Korean Wave 
among Chinese audiences very significant for the following causes.
First, the social influences of hallyu might encourage contemporary Chinese to 
reassess their own cultural legacy, because traditional culture in the People’s Republic 
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of China is experiencing a substantial decline. Cai observes that Chinese people 
admire contemporary South Korean culture because it awakens a distant memory of 
their own traditional civilisation. The professor expresses the hope that the substantial 
impact of the Korean Wave in the People’s Republic of China will give rise to a 
renaissance in traditional Chinese culture (ibid.).
Second, according to the professor, the social impact of the Korean Wave in 
the People’s Republic of China might aid Chinese people in successfully merging 
Oriental and Occidental elements not only in an economic context but also in a 
cultural one, since contemporary South Korean culture is a most eloquent example 
of such a cultural blend, borrowing the best of Western pop cultures and recreating it 
according to Korean tastes (ibid., 105).
It is said that before the surge of the Korean Wave the dominant image of Korea 
for the Taiwanese had been one filled with roughness, violence, and a lack of cultural 
refinement. Due to their cheerful background music, special emphasis on visual 
imagery, and overall professional cinematography, not to mention impeccable acting, 
South Korean dramas have revised the former unfavourable Taiwanese opinion about 
Korea (Sung 2008, 14). For instance, Jennifer Pai, a journalist at the Central News 
Agency of Taiwan, admires South Korea’s ability to enhance its international image 
by emerging from the financial crisis relatively unscathed and simultaneously giving 
birth to the graceful Korean Wave (Pai 2008, 33).
According to Pai, it was due to the import of professionally made South Korean 
TV dramas that the Korean Wave hit the island of Taiwan. However, temporarily 
putting the high quality of the South Korean creative goods aside, Pai adds that the 
popularity of the Korean Wave in the Republic of China likewise owes its existence 
to the fact that Taiwan never had a homogenous deep-rooted culture of its own and 
therefore lacks the social stamina to resist foreign influences (ibid., 34).
Another major factor that Pai discerns as crucial in determining the success of 
South Korean cultural produce is the popularisation of Korean music by Taiwanese 
singers long before the Korean Wave swept the Taiwanese off their feet. As a typical 
example, Pai sets forth the Taiwanese pop-singer Hsu Huaiyu, also known as Yuki 
Hsu, who came to prominence in 1988. On her first and second albums, 4 of 10 and 5 
of 11 songs were of Korean origin (ibid., 35).
The following is a personal account of a certain Miss Chuang, a Taiwanese office 
worker in her 20s, on her first encounter with South Korean pop culture:
When I was a ninth-grader I first saw on cable TV what was being broadcast on Korea’s 
Channel V: hit songs and music performed by H.O.T., Fin.k.l., Sechs Kies, Shinhwa, and 
other bands. I was intoxicated by the Korean performers’ cool and dizzying styles; I 
immediately fell in love with their looks, singing and dancing. I have been enamoured with 
them ever since. (Ibid., 35–6)
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In order to further contribute to the spread of the Korean Wave in Taiwan and 
thus recruit new fans, many of Taiwan’s cable TV channels and radio stations air 
programmes about news pertaining to South Korean entertainment culture. Pai lists 
the following broadcasters: Channel V, MTV, ICRT (International Community Radio 
Taipei), HitFM, etc. (ibid., 37).
Besides the above mentioned Miss Chuang, Pai introduces a certain middle-
class Taiwanese widow who, according to the journalist, is a great fan of the South 
Korean singer Rain (Jung Jihoon), the male protagonist in the South Korean TV 
drama Full House (2004), and would therefore would like to fly to South Korea on 
a buying spree before CDs and MVs containing his artistic output are exported to 
Taiwan. The Taiwanese widow accounts for her seemingly irrational behaviour and 
almost adolescent fervour by pointing out that K-pop and South Korean dramas are 
‘miracles’ that have added spice to her life and made her feel much younger (ibid.).
Further elaborating on the first-hand experiences of the devoted fans of the Korean 
Wave, Pai discusses the case of a certain Mrs. Shen, a successful career woman in her 
late 40s, who continued to ignore the seeming omnipresence of the Korean Wave in 
Taiwan until she was strongly recommended to give it a try by the parents of her son’s 
classmates. Consequently, she rented the whole series of Jewel in the Palace (2003) 
and was immediately bewitched by the historical drama (ibid., 38).
Kathleen Morikawa, a writer living in Japan, equates the climax of the Korean 
Wave in Japan with the Japanese frenzy over the South Korean drama Winter Sonata 
(2002). In November 2004, thousands of Bae Yongjoon fans clogged Narita Airport 
in order to welcome the visiting actor. Morikawa notes that as many as ten people 
were injured as a crowd gathered outside his Tokyo hotel to catch a glimpse of him 
(Morikawa 2008, 83). According to the writer, today the hallyu boom within the 
borders of Japan has transformed into a much calmer but at the same time widespread 
interest in South Korean popular culture, including South Korean customs, lifestyle 
and cuisine (ibid.).
Morikawa emphasises that it would be downright misleading to believe that each 
and every Japanese rides the Korean Wave, for some remain stubbornly uninterested, 
but it is true that the social influences of the Korean Wave have encouraged the 
Japanese to widen their perceptions about Korea and thus to better understand their 
neighbouring country (ibid.).
In Hokkaido, the northern island of Japan where the writer presently resides, South 
Korean dramas are especially popular and signs of the Korean Wave can be seen 
virtually everywhere: local bookstores sell a wide array of hallyu magazines, local 
terrestrial TV broadcasts five to six South Korean TV series each week, etc. Morikawa 
further notices the amazing effect of the Korean Wave in Japan by highlighting that 
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due to popular demand the South Korean dramas in Japan are showed with Japanese 
subtitles and not Japanese voice-overs. Besides, a great many South Korean dramas 
are aired on Japan’s dozens of satellite TV channels (ibid., 84).
Morikawa notes that it was due to the South Korean historical dramas and lighter 
comedies that were both broadcast on satellite TV or available for sale or rental on 
DVD that the number of fans of the Korean Wave expanded to include both sexes and 
all age groups (ibid., 86). Interestingly, the insatiable appetite of the most dedicated 
fans has led major publishers in Tokyo to issue an impressive array of hallyu 
magazines, glossy photo-heavy magazine-like books known in Japan as ‘mooks’ 
(ibid.). Even quicker access to South Korean entertainment news is available via cell 
phones, and truly devoted hallyu fans can even check their intelligence in the field by 
taking an online introductory-level ‘Hallyu Kente’, a Japanese-like proficiency test 
on the Korean Wave, successful completion of which entitles one to a certificate of 
proficiency and might earn a special TV tour to South Korea (ibid., 86–7).
Morikawa stresses that the most popular South Korean dramas in Japan are the 
following: Winter Sonata (2002), Jewel in the Palace (2003), Stairway to Heaven 
(2003), Beautiful Days (2001) and Hotelier (2001). The Japanese fans of the Korean 
Wave perceive the South Korean dramas to be of overall high quality, marked by 
a sincere and straightforward style, embellished with free expression of emotions, 
and endowed with romantic male protagonists (ibid., 87–8). Considering the 
aforementioned category of overall high quality, one should mention excellent camera 
work, underlying passion, professional direction, and witty and original dialogue 
and plots. The distinctness of the South Korean dramas likewise lies in their special 
regard for fashion and beautiful background music (ibid., 88–9).
All in all, contrary to some scholars, Morikawa predicts that the Korean Wave will 
die neither in Japan nor in other East Asian countries and that the Japanese fans of hallyu 
will continue to ride the Korea Wave, thus bringing the peninsula and the archipelago 
even closer together through couch-potato or soap-opera diplomacy (ibid., 90).
The narrow manifestations of the cinematic  
aspect of the Korean Wave in Lithuania
Unless one has been specialising in the East Asia region or has otherwise been 
confronted with Korean issues, the average Lithuanian would describe Korea as an 
extremely distant and politically divided nation in which its citizens eat dogs. In terms 
of South Korea, the overall description would be compounded of such attributes as 
high-tech and prosperous. Concerning North Korea, one would invoke the imminent 
and lethal threat that the socialist regime poses to the international political system.
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Lithuania severely lacks Korea-oriented specialists of any nature much as 
Lithuanian libraries lack academic material covering Korea. Of the three East Asian 
cultures, i.e. pan-Chinese, Japanese and Korean, the latter is by far the least known 
to Lithuanian audiences, its cinematic aspect being no exception. No South Korean 
television drama has ever been aired by any Lithuanian broadcaster. Virtually all of 
the South Korean films that have ever been screened in Lithuanian cinemas have been 
subsumed under the schedule of local film festivals, which are rare and lack proper 
advertising. Essentially no DVD containing any South Korean cinematic goods can 
immediately be purchased in any Lithuanian store.
Despite these impediments, the interest of Lithuanian audiences in the cinematic 
aspect of South Korean popular culture is gradually growing, which is displayed 
by the relatively modest yet steady proliferation of online blogs and chat rooms 
discussing the merits and shortcomings of the new South Korean cinema.
Data provided on the internet website www.kinas.info, which is by far the largest 
online informational site assessing the overall performance of foreign films in the 
Lithuanian market and allowing visitors to evaluate selected cinematic pieces of 
art by means of either voting on a ten-point scale or contributing a comment or 
both, suggest the following: (a) of the sixteen South Korean movies broadcast by 
the four largest Lithuanian broadcasters from 2005 to 2009, six were directed by 
Kiduk Kim; (b) the channel Baltijos (Baltic) TV (BTV) has been the most Korea-
oriented Lithuanian broadcaster, with a total of nineteen broadcasts of South Korean 
cinema from 2006 to 2009; (c) Hwal (2005) by Kim Kiduk, Out Live (2000) by Kim 
Youngyun, and Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter... and Spring (2003) by Kim Kiduk have 
drawn the greatest amount of Lithuanian viewers’ attention with 288, 121 and 109 
votes, respectively.
The data gathered on the official website of the Vilnius International Film Festival 
show that, of fourteen South Korean movies screened in Lithuanian theatres from 
2004 to 2009, five were directed by Kim Kiduk and three by Park Chanwook. The 
screening location of the South Korean movies was predominantly Vilnius and the 
screening duration of the films in question was restricted to a single screening or a 
modest amount of showings over a period of several days. It was extremely rare for 
any film to attract more than a few thousand viewers.
The South Korean government’s response to the Korean Wave
The phenomenal success of South Korean pop culture began to hit the headlines in 
the South Korean media in the late 1990s. The South Korean government realised 
that the export-oriented economy had found a new overseas market in the midst of 
the national plight of the IMF-directed economic restructuring (Shim, Doobo 2008, 
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28). Impressed by the sensational economic performance of South Korean cultural 
commodities abroad, the South Korean government established ‘cultural technology’ 
(i.e. the technology that produces television dramas, films, pop music, computer 
games, animation, etc.) as one of the six key technologies alongside IT (information 
technology) and BT (biotechnology) and pledged a huge amount of financial 
investment and administrative support to domestic cultural industries (ibid.).
Significantly, in 2001 for this very cause the South Korean government founded 
the Korea Culture and Content Agency with an annual budget of US$90 million 
(Lee 2011, 89). It later merged with other institutes to become the Korea Creative 
Content Agency (KOCCA). The official KOCCA leaflet reveals the following 
spheres of activity: (a) support for content production and promotion of creativity, 
encompassing the broadcasting and visual content industry, game industry, cartoon 
industry, character industry, animation industry, and music industry; (b) support 
for exports and international exchange; (c) development and promotion of cultural 
technology (CT) and future convergence content; (d) building infrastructure for the 
content industry; (e) policy development, survey, and research.1
The South Korean government also launched in 2001 Broadcast Worldwide 
(BCWW), an annual broadcasting content tradeshow for developers, distributors, 
buyers, sellers, producers and investors. It is considered Asia’s largest trade fair in 
the broadcasting and visual industry (Alessi 2011, 16). For instance, according to 
data presented by Shim Doobo, the 2005 BCWW was attended by approximately 
3,500 buyers, investors and other media professionals. South Korean producers were 
reported to have earned US$15 million during this four-day event. Specifically, South 
Korean television dramas, including Lovers in Prague (2005) and My Name Is Kim 
Sam-soon (2005), accounted for about US$9 million in sales (Shim, Doobo 2008, 28).
Naturally, as soon as the Korean Wave started, anti-hallyu sentiments began to 
emerge sporadically. Any overtly enthusiastic attempt on the part of the South Korean 
government to promote South Korean cultural commodities is bound to be confronted 
with hostility. Luckily, these have not been numerous. For instance, Shim discerns 
but a few of them, such as the Korean Embassy’s sponsored road shows of South 
Korean films or the Korean Overseas Information Service’s (which is subordinate to 
the Government Information Agency) provision of television dramas to broadcasting 
networks in Egypt and Mongolia free of charge (ibid., 28–9).
1  The official leaflet is available online from <http://eucck.org/storage/contents_files/ 
500_599/579/ kocca.pdf>.
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Conclusions
The overall data gathered while conducting research leads to the conclusion that the 
phenomenon of hallyu was never a calculated attempt on the part of the South Korean 
government to better its international prestige and might, at least in the initial stages 
of the phenomenon in question.
Rather, the rise and spread of the Korean Wave happened due to what may 
only be referred to as felicitous timing and favourable circumstances, both on the 
domestic and international plane. Significantly, while the South Korean government 
always played a supportive and considerate role, its underlying ends were basically 
economic rather than political. Indeed, the very fact that cultural industries can prove 
to be highly profitable was as surprising to South Korean political decision makers as 
the overall international success of the Korean Wave was. More aggressive marketing 
and sporadic attempts to take advantage of the outstanding performance of South 
Korean creative goods abroad were pursued by the South Korean government only 
after the phenomenon in question was in full swing.
The Korean Wave has been significant within the East Asia region because of the 
following reasons: (a) the Korean Wave has provided its overseas fans with personal 
satisfaction; (b) the Korean Wave has bettered the diplomatic relations among the East 
Asia countries; (c) the Korean Wave has set considerably high quality standards for 
any similar prospective regional movements, thus contributing to the overall future 
quality of cultural produce in East Asia; (d) the Korean Wave has fostered healthy 
nationalism, self-esteem, and inter-cultural tolerance in the countries of East Asia.
Even though all elements of the Korean Wave have enjoyed astounding success 
within East Asia, South Korean TV dramas have made the strongest influence on the 
dynamics of the East Asia region, surpassing even that of South Korean films and 
pop music.
So far the manifestations of the cinematic aspect of South Korean popular culture 
and the Korean Wave in general in Lithuania have been relatively meagre and therefore 
insignificant. Among Lithuanian audiences the most popular South Korean movie 
director is Kim Kiduk and the most popular South Korean movie is Kim Kiduk’s 
Hwal (2005). Kino Pavasaris, an international film festival in Vilnius, has screened 
two or more South Korean movies each year since 2004, the status quo implying that 
South Korean cinema has secured itself a modest Lithuanian fan base, which is luckily 
gradually increasing. No official appearances of South Korean television dramas have 
however been witnessed in the Lithuanian media market so far. 
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